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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is a fissure in the federal judicial system—between decision 
and mandate—through which authority and resources are allowed to slip.  
Through this crack in federal procedure, decisions of federal appellate 
courts—duly deliberated and justly rendered—are surrendered forever to 
the ether of vacatur.  Due to the needless separation of the issuance of a 
decision from the issuance of the corresponding mandate, federal courts 
have created a type of limbo in which decisions may exist for a period of 
time before being given full effect and precedential value through 
mandate.  In this period between decision and mandate, decisions have 
been shown to be vulnerable to mootness.  That is, decisions are 
susceptible to the circumstance of post-decision, pre-mandate mootness 
that may ultimately prove fatal to the value of the decision. 
To clarify, the term “decision” refers to an appellate court’s opinion 
that sets out the legal reasoning for its chosen outcome.1  The term 
“mandate,” however, refers to a formal order from an appellate court to a 
lower court that constitutes the actual final judgment on the case.2  Both 
the decision and the mandate must be issued—id est, filed—before either 
takes official effect.3  The subject of this Article is the gap of time after 
the issuance of a decision but before the issuance of a mandate—and 
what happens when a case is rendered moot during that time. 
While federal appellate courts have had rare opportunity to address 
the obvious incongruity of such a situation, the Ninth Circuit, in In re 
Pattullo,4 attempted to address the issue directly.  In Pattullo, the Ninth 
Circuit’s response to the post-decision, pre-mandate mootness of an 
appeal was to vacate its own decision rendered on the appeal, 
eviscerating its own authority and surrendering the value of significant 
resources expended in the rendering of that decision.5 
The Pattullo result has significant implications for the effective and 
efficient rendering of appellate decisions.  In Part II of this Article, we 
examine the specifics and circumstances of the Pattullo decision.  In Part 
III, we articulate the significant problems the Pattullo rule poses for the 
federal courts system.  And in Part IV, we examine alternative 
conclusions to Pattullo-type circumstances, ultimately concluding that 
the most effective approach to post-decision, pre-mandate mootness is to 
                                                                                                                                     
 1 Cf. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 436, 1125 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “decision” and 
“opinion”). 
 2 Cf. id. at 980 (defining “mandate”). 
 3 Cf. id. at 850 (defining “issue”). 
 4 271 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 5 See infra notes 1529 and accompanying text. 
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eliminate the interim between decision and mandate—thereby 
eliminating the possibility for such a conflict to arise. 
II. THE PATTULLO RESULT 
In In re Pattullo,6 the Ninth Circuit was presented with what 
appeared to be a bankruptcy case typical in both procedure and fact.7  
The particular issue presented concerned whether John and Susan 
Pattullo, individual debtors, were eligible for Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
relief.8  The IRS asserted that because the Pattullos owed more than 
$250,000 of unsecured debt, the couple was statutorily precluded from 
seeking Chapter 13 protection.9  The Pattullos countered that the IRS was 
barred from invoking the statutorily prescribed monetary limits due to 
the existence of a prior settlement agreement between the IRS and the 
Pattullos, which stipulated that the Pattullos did not possess more than 
$250,000 in unsecured debt.10  Ultimately, the Pattullos’ eligibility for 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection hinged on whether the IRS’s prior 
stipulation had preclusive effect in the couple’s later bankruptcy 
proceeding.11  The bankruptcy court ruled that it did, and granted the 
Pattullos’ motion for Chapter 13 protection.12  The federal district court 
affirmed,13 and the IRS appealed to the Ninth Circuit.14 
While the appeal was pending before the Ninth Circuit, the 
bankruptcy court dismissed the Pattullos’ underlying Chapter 13 
proceeding “because the Pattullos had failed to comply with the 
requirements of their Chapter 13 plan.”15  The Ninth Circuit panel that 
was considering the IRS’s appeal was not notified of the bankruptcy 
court’s dismissal of the Pattullos’ proceeding, and two weeks later it 
                                                                                                                                     
 6 271 F.3d at 898. 
 7 See id. at 900 (involving an appeal to the Ninth Circuit of a bankruptcy court’s 
decision regarding Chapter 13 relief that had first been appealed to a federal district 
court). 
 8 Id. 
 9 See id. (noting that the IRS filed a motion to dismiss the Chapter 13 proceeding on 
the grounds that the Pattullos had over $250,000 in unsecured debt, and that 11 U.S.C. § 
109(e) (1997) provides Chapter 13 relief only to those with less than $250,000 in 
unsecured debts). 
 10 See id. (noting that the Pattullos sought summary judgment on the IRS’s motion to 
dismiss based on the fact that “[t]he IRS had stipulated to the amount of the Pattullos’ 
unsecured debts as part of a prior settlement between the Pattullos and the IRS”). 
 11 See id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1997)). 
 12 In re Pattullo, 271 F.3d 898, 900 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The bankruptcy court granted 
the Pattullos’ motion, concluding that the prior stipulation had preclusive effect.”). 
 13 See id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1997)). 
 14 Id. (“The IRS appealed [the lower courts’] orders to this court.”). 
 15 Id. 
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issued a decision affirming the district court’s holding.16  However, the 
Ninth Circuit did not immediately issue a mandate accompanying this 
decision.17  Shortly thereafter, the IRS filed a motion to vacate the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision and to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the 
bankruptcy court’s prior dismissal made the Ninth Circuit appeal moot.18  
Upon this motion, the Ninth Circuit found itself in the awkward position 
of having learned of the prior dismissal only after having issued a 
decision but prior to issuing a mandate.19 
The Ninth Circuit correctly observed that, to have jurisdiction over 
a case, a court must be able to grant effective relief between parties.20  
An appeal to a court lacking such ability is moot.21  The Ninth Circuit 
agreed with the IRS that any future mandate it could issue in the case 
would fail to grant relief because the underlying Chapter 13 proceeding 
had been dismissed—any formal order as to the validity of that 
proceeding would be moot.22  Thus, the mandateless Ninth Circuit appeal 
was moot.23 
In Pattullo, it is clear that mootness stripped the Ninth Circuit of its 
jurisdiction to issue a mandate.  But the case raises the perplexing 
question of how to handle decisions in cases that later become moot 
before a mandate is issued.  With little precedential support and no 
explication, the Ninth Circuit offered this conclusory view: “Even after 
an appellate court has issued its decision, if it has not yet issued its 
mandate and the case becomes moot, the court will vacate its decision 
and dismiss the appeal as moot.”24 
                                                                                                                                     
 16 See id. (explaining that the bankruptcy court dismissed the proceeding on June 27, 
2001, and that the Ninth Circuit issued its disposition on July 11, 2001). 
 17 See id. at 901 (noting that the Pattullo court had “yet to issue [its] mandate” by the 
time the IRS informed it about the dismissal of the Chapter 13 proceeding). 
 18 In re Pattullo, 271 F.3d 898, 900 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing the IRS’s motion to 
vacate and dismiss, which was filed two weeks after the Ninth Circuit issued its 
decision). 
 19 See id. at 901 (“[W]hile we issued our memorandum disposition prior to the IRS 
bringing to our attention the dismissal of the Pattullos’ Chapter 13 proceeding, we have 
yet to issue our mandate.”). 
 20 See id. (“[W]hile we issued our memorandum disposition prior to the IRS bringing 
to our attention the dismissal of the Pattullos’ Chapter 13 proceeding, we have yet to 
issue our mandate.”). 
 21 See id. (“Our mootness inquiry focuses upon whether we can still grant relief 
between the parties.”). 
 22 See id. at 902 (“Because the Chapter 13 proceeding has been dismissed, any ruling 
as to its validity would be moot.”). 
 23 See id. (dismissing the case as moot in light of the bankruptcy court’s dismissal). 
 24 In re Pattullo, 271 F.3d 898, 90102 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Miller, 
685 F.2d 123, 124 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982)).  The Pattullo court’s support for this 
proposition is discussed in great depth in Part III. A., infra. 
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Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the merits of the 
Pattullos’ case was vacated, and the IRS’s appeal was dismissed.25  By 
vacating its own decision, the Ninth Circuit avoided the thorny issues 
inherent in post-decision, pre-mandate mootness by creating a 
superficially sound rule. 
III. THE PROBLEM WITH PATTULLO 
By addressing the post-decision, pre-mandate mootness issue in 
such a manner, the Pattullo court set a clear and strict rule: When a case 
becomes moot after a decision is issued but before a mandate is issued, 
the decision shall be vacated.26  While the Pattullo court’s vacatur of its 
own decision seems to have been a reasonable method by which to 
resolve the problems posed by post-judgment, pre-mandate mootness, the 
likelihood for appropriate application of such a method across any 
spectrum of similar cases is slim. 
The effects of such a decision are apparent: A vacated decision has 
no precedential effect,27 is in essence reversed,28 and is effectively 
stripped of all persuasive authority.29  For any decision that may become 
moot before an accompanying mandate is issued, the Pattullo treatment 
is utterly fatal.  However, such treatment is potentially problematic for 
various legal and policy reasons, and is not the most desirable in light of 
our modern court structure or any number of traditional judicial 
ambitions. 
A. The Pattullo Decision Lacks Precedential Support 
The rule suggested by Pattullo is unsupported in case law.  A close 
study of the authority offered by the Ninth Circuit in support of the 
Pattullo rule indicates that there is, in fact, no precedent requiring 
                                                                                                                                     
 25 See id. at 902 (“We lack jurisdiction over this case and must accordingly vacate 
our memorandum disposition and dismiss this appeal.”). 
 26 See id. at 90102. 
 27 Durning v. Citibank, N.A., 950 F.2d 1419, 1424 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[A] decision 
that has been vacated has no precedential authority whatsoever.”). 
 28 See, e.g., DOROTHY W. NELSON, ET AL., FEDERAL NINTH CIRCUIT CIVIL APPELLATE 
PRACTICE 10:262 (“[T]he effect of reversal and vacatur is essentially the same and the 
court occasionally uses the terms interchangeably.”).  Compare Cal. Dept. of Soc. Servs. 
v. Thompson, 321 F.3d 835, 847 (9th Cir. 2003) (using reversal to nullify the lower 
court’s decision), with Orff v. United States, 358 F.3d 1137, 1149 (9th Cir. 2004) (using 
vacatur to render the district court’s ruling null). 
 29 See, e.g., Russman v. Bd. of Educ., 260 F.3d 114, 122 n.2 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating 
that the persuasive authority of a federal court’s order is lost if that order is vacated); Jo 
Ann J. Brighton, et al., Yellowstone: New Standards for Lender Ability in Today’s 
Economic Climate, 287 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28, 84 (2009) (noting that a landmark 
bankruptcy case was no longer persuasive authority after being vacated). 
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vacatur of a decision unaccompanied by a mandate in the event that the 
underlying case becomes moot.30 
The Pattullo court’s grand claim that post-decision, pre-mandate 
mootness requires vacatur of a decision is supported by a single citation 
referencing United States v. Miller31—a tax fraud case arising from the 
Former Fifth Circuit.32  However, the laconic Miller opinion does little to 
shed light on what should be done with decisions unaccompanied by 
mandate that later become moot.  In Miller, as in Pattullo, the underlying 
case became moot after the federal circuit court issued its opinion on the 
presented appeal, but before it issued an accompanying mandate.33  After 
simply stating that “the instant case has . . . become moot,” the Miller 
court held that the “previous opinion of this court . . . is vacated.”34  
However, like the Pattullo court, the Miller court offers little basis for 
why such an opinion must be vacated.  The Miller court cites as its sole 
guidance United States v. Munsingwear, Inc.,35 a 1950 Supreme Court 
case.36 
While the authoritative trail in support of the Pattullo rule ends 
with the sexagenarian Munsingwear, the Munsingwear opinion does not 
actually support a rule requiring vacatur of mandateless decisions in 
cases that become moot, as provided in Pattullo and Miller.  The relevant 
portion of Munsingwear merely states, 
The established practice of the Court in dealing with a civil case 
from a court in the federal system which has become moot while on its 
way here or pending our decision on the merits is to reverse or vacate the 
judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss.37 
Aside from the fact that Munsingwear’s language can be strictly 
interpreted to apply only to civil cases before the Supreme Court, even a 
broad reading of Munsingwear does not buttress the Pattullo and Miller 
rules regarding post-decision, pre-mandate mootness. 
At most, Munsingwear establishes merely that a federal appellate 
court will vacate (or reverse) a lower court decision and remand to 
dismiss if a federal appeal becomes moot while pending a decision 
                                                                                                                                     
 30 See infra notes 34 to 40. 
 31 685 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). 
 32 See In re Pattullo, 271 F.3d 898, 90001 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Miller, 685 F.2d at 
124). 
 33 See Miller, 685 F.2d at 124 (noting that the appeal was rendered moot “[b]efore 
issuance of the mandate in the instant case,” but after a previous opinion was published at 
660 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981)). 
 34 Id. 
 35 340 U.S. 36 (1950). 
 36 See Miller, 685 F.2d at 124 (citing Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 36). 
 37 Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 39. 
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before the appellate court.  Contrary to what the Miller and Pattullo 
courts assert, Munsingwear contemplates neither mootness arising after a 
federal appellate court has issued its decision, nor the proper role of the 
mandate.38  Furthermore, Munsingwear does not discuss the 
circumstance of a federal court vacating its own decision in the face of 
mootness—its consideration is limited to the vacatur of a prior lower 
court decision.  Consequently, even the most generous reading of 
Munsingwear fails to provide precedential support for Pattullo’s harshly 
strict result requiring vacatur of mandateless decisions once their cases 
have become moot.  And because the precedent asserted as support for 
the Pattullo and Miller holdings is flimsy at best (and completely lacking 
at worst), the validity of the conclusions reached by these two courts 
regarding post-decision, pre-mandate mootness must be seriously 
questioned. 
B. The Pattullo Result Allows Parties to Negate the Exercise of Judicial 
Authority 
Pattullo’s conclusion that issued decisions must be vacated in the 
event the underlying case becomes moot presents another significant 
issue for the federal judicial system.  It could allow parties to short-
circuit the decision-making process, thereby permitting parties—and not 
federal judges—to shape law.  Such a result is offensive to traditionally-
held values relating to the law generally and the form and function of the 
judiciary specifically. 
Federal courts are endowed with a certain power to say what the 
law is.39  Federal courts are comprised of federal judges who rise to their 
office only through the successful navigation of an oftentimes rigorous, 
constitutionally-mandated nomination and confirmation process.40  This 
appointment process, which is at the same time both a pillar and 
reflection of certain constitutionally-valued principles, has endured little 
deviation since our country’s inception.  This is a carefully crafted 
process which aspires to do no less than to safeguard justice by reserving 
the powers of judicial review, statutory interpretation, and the like, to a 
                                                                                                                                     
 38 See id. (including no mention of mandates or post-decision mootness). 
 39 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically 
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
 40 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (detailing the nomination and approval process of 
Supreme Court judges); Judiciary Act of 1891 (Evarts Act), ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 43 (2006)), extended by the Act of Sept. 6, 1916, ch. 
448, 39 Stat. 726 (creating the circuit courts of appeals and detailing the method of 
appointing circuit judges). 
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select few anointed by elected federal representatives.41  However, the 
Pattullo result permits the usurpation of those powers by parties who 
find the result of an appropriately undertaken federal judicial proceeding 
to be potentially adverse. 
Consider the following hypothetical: Alpha Co. sues Beta Co. in 
federal court.  Alpha wins.  Beta appeals a determination of law made by 
the district court.  The federal circuit court executes a diligent review—it 
receives briefs, hears oral argument, and undertakes all reasonable and 
regular deliberation of the issues.  The circuit court ultimately issues a 
decision affirming the lower court’s determination of law, but does not 
immediately issue an accompanying mandate that formally orders the 
result stated in the decision.  Importantly, the circuit court’s decision 
interprets the applicable law in a manner that both Alpha and Beta feel to 
be potentially adverse to the parties’ long-term interests.  Alpha and Beta 
are both repeat players in federal courts, and because both parties are 
likely to litigate similar issues in the future, it is in neither party’s long-
term interest to see the circuit court’s disfavored interpretation of law 
become binding precedent.  For that reason, Alpha and Beta execute a 
settlement intended to render—and effectively rendering—the 
underlying case moot.42  Before the circuit can issue a mandate in the 
case, it notices that Alpha and Beta no longer have a case or controversy 
for which the circuit can grant effective relief.  Per Pattullo, the circuit 
court dismisses Beta v. Alpha as moot and vacates its own decision 
regarding the applicable law. 
The result of this hypothetical is unfortunate.  Alpha and Beta have 
effectively usurped the authority of the circuit court by deciding whether 
or not the circuit’s interpretation of applicable law will stand as valid 
precedent or be erased from case law by vacatur.  The parties received a 
preview of the precedent that will ultimately bind them, and then seized 
upon an opportunity to eliminate the precedential threat.  In effect, the 
parties have exercised a veto of forthcoming federal case law.  Parties—
not judges—have determined legal precedent. 
                                                                                                                                     
 41 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (noting that federal judges are confirmed by 
elected federal representatives). 
 42 There may be some cases that fall into exceptions of the mootness doctrine, but 
there will be some that do not. See 15 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 101.99 (3d ed.2009) 
(detailing the exceptions to mootness and characterizing them as narrow). Moreover, 
crafty parties acting in consort may be able to conceal that the case is not properly 
characterized as moot.  As an aside, note that the amount of the settlement will depend on 
the value assigned by Alpha and Beta, respectively, to avoiding precedent at issue.  And 
although Alpha will win the immediate case by not settling, it will nevertheless settle 
when the long-term cost of the disfavored precedent exceeds the short-term gain from the 
immediate verdict. 
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A thorough discussion of why such a rule is constitutionally 
questionable or consequentially dangerous is grist for a different mill.  It 
is sufficient to note the apparent disharmony of this outcome with 
existing notions of federal judicial power.  Litigating parties, unlike 
federal judges, have not been subjected to selective nomination, 
confirmation, and appointment processes designed to reserve judicial 
authority to a narrow class.  They were not chosen by elected 
representatives to interpret the law of the land with the advisement and 
consent of other similarly selected individuals.  Thus, endowing parties 
with what amounts to a veto power over forthcoming precedent runs 
contrary to the constitutionally mandated structure of our federal 
judiciary.  The Pattullo rule, in some sense, could at times elevate parties 
to a position where they enjoy co-equal power with the federal appellate 
bench.  Consequently, the Pattullo rule is constitutionally questionable 
because it allows federal law to be vetoed by persons and corporations 
who are not appropriately vested—constitutionally or statutorily—with 
the power to determine federal law.    
The negative consequences of Pattullo-enabled party vetoes of 
federal law are easily foreseeable.  Private individuals and corporations, 
under the Pattullo rule, could essentially ratify or veto precedent to avoid 
judicial outcomes against their self-interest.  This has several adverse 
results.  For instance, it stunts the growth of federal legal precedent, the 
law will take a shape that best accommodates the desires of savvy repeat 
litigants without regard for judicial intent or non-repeat players, and the 
strength of statutory law will atrophy as such laws are shaped by 
strategic precedent derailment.  This last point is particularly troubling 
for those concerned about popular expression given the fact that, in our 
democratic system, popular expression is entrusted to elected 
representatives, whose subsequent expression is partially manifested in 
statutory law.  However, as noted, the problems with allowing non-
judges to determine federal law are too obvious and too abundant to fully 
address in this limited space. 
Finally, it is important to recognize that a post-decision, pre-
mandate settlement is but one of many ways in which federal judicial 
impotence might occur given the Pattullo rule.  For example—local rules 
permitting—Alpha might withdraw its original complaint,43 or Beta 
might withdraw its appeal.44  Any such scenario could result in the 
                                                                                                                                     
 43 See, e.g., Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 200–01 (1988) (holding that 
respondents’ withdrawal of their complaints rendered the appeal moot). 
 44 See, e.g., United States v. Radin, 865 F.2d 266, 266 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Because 
[defendant] has withdrawn his appeal, this issue is now moot as to him.”). 
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usurpation of federal judicial power by savvy parties with a view towards 
the long term. 
C. The Pattullo Result Precipitates a Waste of Judicial Resources 
Judicial resources are scarce.45  Accordingly, wasting judicial 
resources is discouraged.46  Academic proposals to conserve judicial 
resources abound,47 and numerous legal standards recognize the value of 
limited judicial assets.48  Pattullo’s result dictating that post-decision, 
pre-mandate mootness requires vacatur of the decision results in a 
massive waste of judicial resources by inappropriately erasing a decision 
reached through the significant expenditure of judicial resources.  Thus, 
even as a policy matter, the Pattullo rule is vulnerable to meaningful 
criticism. 
Any time an appeal is dismissed as moot after a decision has been 
issued—without regard to whether or not the mootness results from the 
intentional derailment of disfavored precedent—a significant amount of 
judicial resources is spent.49  The entire value of the time, work, and 
expense consumed in considering the appeal and reaching a decision is 
lost.  This is an unfortunate but unavoidable feature of our federal courts 
system and the mootness doctrine.  However, what is not necessary—and 
what is certainly not unavoidable—is the vacatur of a mandateless 
decision in a case that later becomes moot. 
The establishment of precedent is the value received in exchange 
for the expenditure of scarce judicial resources.  Having received that 
precedent, our legal landscape is endowed with some measure of clarity 
                                                                                                                                     
 45 See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2567–68 (2010) (describing “judicial 
resources” as “scarce”); Kenyeres v. Ashcroft, 538 U.S. 1301, 1388 (2003) (noting the 
scarcity of judicial resources). 
 46 See, e.g., San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 337 n.24 
(2005) (expressing the “desire to conserve judicial resources.”); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731–32 (2002) (noting, in passing, that 
conservation of judicial resources is desirable). 
 47 See, e.g., Bruce Zucker & Michelle Carey, Capturing the Harm: Defining “Tax 
Loss” for Use in Federal Sentencing, 15 AKRON TAX J. 1, 15 (2000) (advocating for a 
federal sentencing policy that will conserve judicial resources); Elizabeth Fella, Note, 
Playing Catch Up: Changing the Bankruptcy Code to Accommodate America’s Growing 
Number of Non-Traditional Couples, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681, 704 (2005) (proposing a 
change to the bankruptcy code because, in part, it “will conserve judicial resources”). 
 48 See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009) (limiting the 
applicability of precedent regarding qualified immunity because, in part, it “sometimes 
results in a substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources”); Massaro v. United 
States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) (noting federal courts’ implementation of a procedural 
rule intended to conserve judicial resources). 
 49 See Daniel A. Zariski, et al., Mootness in the Class-Action Context, 26 REV. LITIG. 
77, 112 (2007) (discussing how allowing a party to moot a named plaintiff’s claim, and 
thereby avoid class certification, at the last moment wastes judicial and party resources). 
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and guidance for the resolution of future disputes.50  When a court 
vacates a decision, it completely strips that decision of precedential 
effect.51  It is unable to provide clarity or guidance to any legal actor,52 
and the accompanying loss of judicial resources is a sunk cost.  Vacatur 
prevents the precedents that (in part) validate the use of judicial 
resources. 
Accordingly, it is clear that a desire to prevent the injudicious 
consumption of judicial resources is further ground to harshly consider 
the Pattullo result.  An avoidance of vacatur would therefore serve policy 
interests as well as the legal interests previously discussed.53 
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE PATTULLO RULE 
As discussed above, the Pattullo rule regarding post-decision, pre-
mandate mootness is unsupported by case law and unsupportable in the 
face of certain legal and policy arguments.  Fortunately, there are a 
number of alternative ways in which courts may address post-decision, 
pre-mandate mootness without vacating the decision and running 
contrary to the previously articulated interests.  The approaches 
described herein certainly do not represent the entire universe of 
available alternatives to the Pattullo rule, but they are surely among the 
most intuitive.  Furthermore, having surveyed many of the alternatives 
                                                                                                                                     
 50 In re Memorial Hosp. of Iowa County, Inc., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(“When a clash between genuine adversaries produces a precedent, however, the judicial 
system ought not allow the social value of that precedent, created at cost to the public and 
other litigants, to be a bargaining chip in the process of settlement. The precedent, a 
public act of a public official, is not the parties’ property.”). See also Donald G. Gifford, 
Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 790 (2003) 
(“In the common law system, past precedents—albeit interpreted in light of changing 
current social and economic conditions—should guide courts as they undertake to bring 
clarity to . . . the law.”); see also Darlene C. Goring, Private Problem, Public Solution: 
Affirmative Action in the 21st Century, 33 AKRON L. REV. 209, 286–87 (2000) (noting 
that “Supreme Court precedent . . . offer[s] guidance” on race-based remedial affirmative 
action programs); Jeffrey M. Olson, Note, Gauging an Adequate Probable Cause 
Standard for Provisional Arrest in Light of Parretti v. United States, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 
161, 202 (1998) (noting that legal precedent provides great clarity on the topic of the 
Constitution’s applicability in certain international law enforcement scenarios). 
 51 Durning v. Citibank, N.A., 950 F.2d 1419, 1424 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[A] decision 
that has been vacated has no precedential authority whatsoever.”). 
 52 See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
 53 This position also finds support in Humphreys v. DEA, where the Third Circuit 
chose not to vacate a decision given the existing absence of case law on the topic at issue.  
105 F.3d 112, 116 (3d Cir. 1996) (“In light of the complete absence of case law 
interpreting the relevant statute, we believe it would not be prudent to withdraw our 
opinion.”).  See also Part III. A.–B., supra. 
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and explored the contours of our federal courts system, it appears that 
these are also among the most viable. 
A. Permit the Decision to Stand as Valid Precedent 
Perhaps the most obvious alternative to the Pattullo result is to 
permit a federal court’s decision to stand as valid precedent even though 
the underlying case became moot prior to the issue of an accompanying 
mandate.  This would endow the decision with full precedential force 
despite the dismissal of the underlying case as moot and no issue of a 
subsequent mandate.  This alternative would necessarily view the 
decision as having significance independent from the mandate.  That is, 
the decision is not dependent upon the issuance of an accompanying 
mandate for precedential value. This is precisely what the Third Circuit 
did in Humphreys v. DEA, an appeal involving the post-decision, pre-
mandate death of the appellant54 
This alternative proposal has potential pitfalls.  Most notably, it is 
of questionable constitutionality, in part because federal courts are barred 
from issuing advisory opinions and other such decisions where a genuine 
dispute is absent.55  Of course, this alternative would not permit the 
issuance of advisory opinions per se because the decisions in question 
would have been issued at times when true cases or controversies were 
before the deciding federal courts.  However, these decisions 
nevertheless apply to ultimately moot cases, and it is not clear if the fact 
of their premature issuance should save them from vacatur or some like 
fate. 
Contrariwise, if the jurisdictional minefield could be successfully 
navigated and this alternative was considered constitutional, then a 
decent argument could be made in support of this alternative.  
Specifically, an objector to this alternative would be hard-pressed to 
offer meaningful reasons against permitting the decision to stand as 
precedent.  The decision, despite mootness, is the product of the same 
rigor, deliberation, and litigation as any other precedential decision.  
Consequently, it is reasonable to assert that such a decision merits as 
                                                                                                                                     
 54 105 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 55 “[C]ourts should not render decisions absent a genuine need to resolve a real 
dispute.” 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3532.1, at 114 (2d ed. 1984).  This principle is an 
invocation of the doctrine of ripeness, and regarding ripeness the Supreme Court has said 
that the ripeness doctrine is “drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power 
and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.” Nat’l Park Hospitality 
Ass’n v. Dep’t of The Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807 (2003) (citing Reno v. Catholic Soc. 
Servs., Inc. 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993) (internal quotations omitted)). 
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much authority as any other case decided by the same court at the same 
time in the same way. 
Ultimately, in light of itsquestionable constitutionality, permitting 
mandateless decisions in cases that later become moot to enjoy full 
precedential authority is perhaps not the best alternative to the Pattullo 
rule.  More conservative and less problematic alternatives exist. 
B. Deem the Decision Non-Precedential Without Vacatur 
A second alternative to the Pattullo rule requiring vacatur of a 
decision lacking an accompanying mandate in instances where the 
underlying case has become moot is to deem the decision non-
precedential without requiring vacatur.  That is, federal appellate courts 
could issue an order stating that the previously issued decision “lacks 
precedential value” and “cannot be cited as authority.”56  By such an 
order, the opinion would not stand as binding precedent.  Accordingly, 
the constitutional concerns raised by advisory opinions and the like may 
be further lessened, though perhaps not completely silenced.57 
The difference between this alternative and the Pattullo rule may 
not be readily apparent, but it is critical nonetheless: A non-precedential 
decision—known in some jurisdictions as a memorandum opinion58—
may provide valuable guidance to future parties and judicial actors 
despite its character as non-binding precedent.59  Parties may look to 
non-precedential decisions to better understand the factual circumstances 
that have historically led a particular court to particular outcomes.  Put 
simply, decisions have value though they may be non-binding. Courts 
can avoid a needless waste of judicial resources by giving mandateless 
decision in cases later rendered moot a status akin to that held by 
memorandum opinions.  Because such decisions have value even though 
                                                                                                                                     
 56 See, e.g., MJG Enters. v. Cloyd, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102579, at *21 n.1 (D. 
Ariz. Sept. 27, 2010) (explaining that “a de-published opinion has no precedential effect 
and cannot be cited as authority in any court”); see also, e.g., Payne v. Peninsula Sch. 
Dist., 621 F.3d 1001, 1001 (9th Cir. 2010) (ordering that Payne be taken en banc, and 
that the three-judge panel decision “shall not be cited as precedent by or to any court of 
the Ninth Circuit”). 
 57 See supra notes 55 and 56 and accompanying text.  The concerns are lessened 
because the resulting opinion would have been issued when there was a live case or 
controversy, it would not bind the parties as their case is already moot, and it would not 
have precedential effect. That being said, the concerns may not be wholly eliminated. If a 
case becomes mooted before the decision is issued, courts cannot then release a 
memorandum opinion; that would still be an advisory opinion. Therefore, one may object 
that the memorandum opinion here applies to an ultimately moot case and therefore, like 
the “binding opinion” alternative discussed in Part IV.A. supra, it is also of questionable 
constitutionality. 
 58 See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING § 2.4.2. 
 59 Id. 
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they are non-binding, this alternative is preferable to erasing such 
decisions from judicial history via vacatur.  It also aids in ensuring that 
judge-written law remains a resource for legal actors—and mutes the 
power of parties to dictate or veto federal law. Though this seems like a 
viable solution, in light of the lingering constitutional concerns, we think 
a better solution remains. 
C. Require Simultaneous Issuance of Decisions and Mandates 
The best alternative to the Pattullo rule is simply to require federal 
appellate courts to issue decisions simultaneously with accompanying 
mandates.  This would altogether eliminate the lag between the issuance 
of the decision and the issuance of the mandate.  Accordingly, it would 
be impossible for a case to become moot in the interim between the 
issuance of the decision and the issuance of the mandate.  The Pattullo 
problem could be avoided entirely, rather than ham-handedly remedied.  
Presently, the main reason for the failure to issue decisions 
simultaneously with accompanying mandates is to allow for a petition for 
rehearing.60  Beyond that, sheer bureaucratic inefficiency is a likely 
contributor to the problem.   Neither provides a compelling rationale for 
needlessly exposing the decision-making process to the type of 
awkwardness and confusion illustrated by Pattullo and Miller. Regarding 
the allowance for rehearing, courts could issue the mandate 
simultaneously with the decision, and simply recall the mandate if 
rehearing is required.61  Thus, any interim between decision and mandate 
is without justifiable motivation. 
Because the requirement that courts issue decisions simultaneously 
with accompanying mandates is novel, it is unclear what undesirable 
effect might result from such a rule, if any.  Perhaps such a requirement 
would have the unintended consequence of slowing the federal appellate 
process.  Perhaps such a requirement would increase the already 
substantial costs of justice-seeking by creating additional administrative 
burdens for the justice system to bear.  However, these hypothetical 
concerns seem nominal and, particularly in light of the structural and 
policy concerns articulated above,62 well worth the anticipated benefits. 
                                                                                                                                     
60 FED. R. APP. P. 41 (“The court’s mandate must issue 7 days after the time to file a 
petition for rehearing expires, or 7 days after entry of an order denying a timely petition 
for panel rehearing, petition for rehearing en banc, or motion for stay of mandate, 
whichever is later. The court may shorten or extend the time.”). 
61 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41 expressly allows the court to shorten the time 
period between decision and mandate.  FED. R. APP. P. 41.  Moreover, courts commonly 
recall their mandates for a variety of reasons.  
 62 See Part III, supra. 
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In sum, the best way of handling post-decision, pre-mandate 
mootness is to prevent it from happening altogether.  The creation of 
federal statutory or court rules requiring that federal appellate courts 
issue mandates simultaneously with decisions could avoid potential 
Pattullo- and Miller-like situations.  This would accordingly eliminate 
the power of litigating parties to usurp judicial authority by 
manufacturing mootness in the face of disfavored precedent.  It would 
also eliminate the obvious waste resulting from the vacatur of already-
rendered decisions.  Therefore, by following this path, our federal courts 
could avoid the adverse consequences resulting from Pattullo. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Pattullo, the Ninth Circuit held that “[e]ven after an appellate 
court has issued its decision, if it has not yet issued its mandate and the 
case becomes moot, the court will vacate its decision and dismiss the 
appeal as moot.”63  This unsupported assertion appears to have ignored 
any reasonable calculation of the potential effects such a result might 
have in the aggregate and in different situations.  The Pattullo rule 
allows the evisceration of circuit authority in favor of the precedential 
preference of the litigating parties and precipitates a gross waste of 
judicial resources.  In short, this rule exacerbates a procedural wrinkle in 
our federal courts system, and it ought to be replaced. 
The most effective and intuitive alternative to the Pattullo rule 
would be a federal statutory or court rule requiring that accompanying 
mandates be issued simultaneously with their decisions.  Such a rule 
would avoid the negative consequence of a Pattullo- or Miller-type 
situation by eliminating the foolish inconsistency of separating decision 
from mandate.  And in doing so, such a rule would create a more 
complete relationship between mandate and decision that even the most 
cunning of litigants would be hard-pressed to tear asunder. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
 63 Id. at 90102 (citing United States v. Miller, 685 F.2d 123, 124 (5th Cir. Unit B 
1982).  The Pattullo court’s support for this proposition is discussed in great depth in Part 
III. A., supra. 
 
